Mazu was born in 960 AD to a well-established family on Meizhou Island in Fujian Province. Even at a young age, he exhibited remarkable intelligence. He had knowledge of Chinese medicine and astronomy. Additionally, he had an outstanding swimming ability. He was credited with saving lives from shipwrecks and helped coastal dwellers plan safe routes. There are several legends about his “death,” but it is believed that he was sacrificed at age 28.
CIA’s retaliatory response to chinese intelligence deity
U.S. intelligence officials have noted a recent reorganization of the Ministry of State Security, China’s main civilian intelligence agency. Before the purge, the Ministry of State Security was riddled with petty corruption. Some government-affiliated hackers moonlighted as cybercriminals and received a cut of the profits. This isn’t a coincidence.
Before the shake-up between 2010 and 2012, China had stolen plenty of data from U.S. and foreign intelligence agencies. But the shake-up gave Beijing the impetus to expand its targets and create infrastructure for processing stolen data. After the CIA’s spying on the Chinese government began, U.S. officials began to watch intelligence facilities in China near language and data centers.
CIA’s human source network in China
The CIA’s human source network in China has come under fire after it was discovered to have been compromised. The agency’s official liaison with the Chinese security services is an attaché in Beijing. As a result, CIA headquarters feared the worst. But over the years, the CIA has rebuilt its network.
But how can the CIA combat this problem? It must have a good human source network in China. It is not easy to obtain a reliable source inside China. The CIA relies on human spies and digital means to gather information. But the intelligence gathered by the CIA inside China is often frustratingly poor. The CIA’s new policy shift may help it combat this challenge. It would enable it to build geographical experts over the long run, and field them in the right places.
The CIA’s human source network in China has been severely compromised. Chinese officials have killed or arrested dozens of suspected U.S. spies in recent years. In response to the revelations, the CIA has beefed up operational security. The numbers of human sources executed by rival services are usually closely guarded.
The Chinese government has killed or imprisoned twenty CIA sources. One of them was even shot in a government building courtyard. While the CIA declined to comment on the report, former CIA officials said the information flowing from sources dried up after 2010 and the informants disappeared.
Lee was the most valuable spie the Chinese government has ever recruited. The Chinese government has been accused of exploiting American informants for decades. In 2007, two former CIA officers, Kevin Mallory and Candace Marie Claiborne, were arrested and indicted on charges of providing secret information to Chinese intelligence officers in exchange for cash.
The CIA’s human source network in China was severely hampered in 2013 when the Chinese government learned about the agency’s operations. However, the CIA rebuilt the network and has continued to use it to target terrorism. This means that the CIA has better staffed remote outposts in the country. Rather than concentrating on building budgets and hiring Mandarin speakers, the CIA needs to invest in developing officers with the necessary expertise. This goes beyond hiring Mandarin-speaking officers and investing in technology. It goes to the core of the agency.
While the names of the missing CIA agents were never published, the CIA’s human source network in China has become a focus of Chinese investigation. In 2017, the CIA’s China division began to focus on the moles recruited from the highest levels of the Chinese government. This means that it was a matter of time before the CIA faced the consequences of exposing their human source network in the country.
The CIA’s human source network in China was officially accredited by the Guoanbu office in Beijing and Li Dong’s East Gardens headquarters. This is part of the limited cooperation between the two countries during the Cold War. This allowed the CIA to recruit Chinese diplomats and scientists. However, the recruitment process was still clandestine and operated under non-official cover.
During the period in question, the CIA’s human source network in China was operated on an encrypted, internet-based communication system. This system allowed the agency to communicate with its sources remotely. Moreover, it separated the source from the main communications system, reducing the risk if the asset goes bad.
The CIA’s Chinese human source network was able to recruit more Chinese intelligence officers than ever before. In fact, the CIA’s human source network in China has expanded to include a new branch devoted to the country. The newly created China Mission Center has increased the agency’s spying capabilities and is allocating a larger budget for the operation.
